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ABSTRACT
We consider prospects for retirement saving for members of the millennial generation,
who will be between ages 54 and 69 in 2050. Adequacy of retirement saving preparation among
current and near-retirees is marked by significant heterogeneity, a characteristic that will likely
hold for Millennials as well. In preparing for retirement, Millennials will have several
advantages relative to previous generations, such as more education, longer working lives, and
more flexible work arrangements, but also several disadvantages, including having to take more
responsibility for their own retirement plans and marrying and bearing children at later ages. The
millennial generation contains a significantly higher percentage of minorities than previous
generations. We find that minority households have tended to accumulate less wealth than whites
in the past, even after controlling for income, education, and marital status, and the difference
appears to be growing over time for black households relative to whites. Whether these trends
persist is central to understanding how the Millennials will fare in retirement.
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I. Introduction
How will changing demographic and economic factors affect households’ ability to
accumulate adequate resources for retirement over the next 30 years? Because the answers to
such a question are necessarily speculative, our goal in this paper is to provide different forms of
evidence that can help frame thinking about this issue. In particular, we (1) review what is
known about the adequacy of retirement saving among current generations of retirees and near-
retirees, (2) examine how economic factors that affect retirement saving seem likely to differ
between prior generations and the Millennials (who will be aged 54 to 69 in 2050), and (3)
consider how the changing minority composition of the population will affect retirement saving.
Section II discusses previous findings on the adequacy of retirement saving among
current retirees or near-retirees. We highlight the conceptual issues in determining whether
people are saving adequately and review previous studies. We document significant
heterogeneity in how well people have saved for retirement among Generation Xers and Baby
Boomers. This heterogeneity is not surprising given the widening income distribution of the last
several decades and the uneven retirement preparation and plan participation shown in the data.
In particular, the literature suggests that several significant subgroups of the population—
including racial and ethnic minorities, women, those with income between the poverty level and
the median, those with less than a college degree, individuals in poor health, and workers without
3a pension—are more vulnerable to retirement saving shortfalls than are others.
In Section III, we explore a variety of issues that differentially affect the millennial
generation relative to prior generations. The Millennials have certain advantages over previous
generations in terms of retirement saving; for example, they are the most educated generation in
history. Furthermore, because of the evolution of the pension system toward defined contribution
(DC) plans, they may well work longer than any previous generation, giving them additional
years to save.
However, Millennials also face numerous disadvantages. Their careers have gotten off to
a rocky start because of the financial crisis and Great Recession in 2007-9 and the ensuing slow
(but steady) recovery over the subsequent few years. They will be employed in contingent
workforce jobs (which have weaker retirement benefits than traditional jobs) to a greater extent
than previous generations. They have lower net worth and higher student debt burdens than
earlier generations at the same age, and they are marrying, buying homes, and having children
later. They will be required to manage and navigate their own retirement plans to a greater extent
than previous generations, while also likely having longer lifespans.1 They will face increased
burdens from any eventual resolution of the government’s long-term fiscal shortfalls in general,
and the financial imbalances in Social Security and Medicare in particular. They face an
economic future with projections of lower rates of return and economic growth than in the past.
These factors make accumulating sufficient funds for retirement more difficult for Millennials
relative to previous generations.
Section IV examines the effects of the projected changes in the racial and ethnic
composition of the population. The United States will be a “majority-minority” country by 2050,
1 While living longer is obviously a good thing, having a longer retirement period (defined as the difference between
life span and retirement age) makes it harder, other things equal, to finance adequate living standards in retirement.
4where minority is defined as any race other than non-Hispanic white. All races and ethnicities
other than white are expected to grow as a share of the population. Using cross-section and
pooled regressions from the 1989-2016 Surveys of Consumer Finances, we show that minority
status is negatively associated with net worth, controlling for other household characteristics.
The difference in wealth between blacks and whites is growing over time, controlling for other
factors.
These results have implications for Millennials. The set of economic and social
conditions that racial and ethnic minorities experience by 2050 will likely be different from those
experienced by previous generations – including family and marital status, education,
neighborhoods, discrimination, and job markets.  Such differences in the future could serve
either to raise or reduce wealth gaps between whites and minorities.  That said, minorities in
recent years faced different economic and social conditions than did minorities 30 years ago, yet
wealth differences between whites and minorities, controlling for observable characteristics,
have grown rather than fallen over time.  If this trend continues, wealth inequality will continue
to grow, which will make it that much harder for minorities to save adequately for retirement.
Section V concludes. Ensuring the adequacy of saving presents enormous challenges and
risks for individuals, government, and businesses. However, it also generates unique
opportunities for creative public policies and innovative private markets to greatly improve
people’s lives.
II. The Adequacy of Retirement Saving2
Whether households are saving adequately for retirement is often addressed as a yes/no
2 Much of this section and the following section are based on Fichtner and Gale (2017).
5question. But even a moment’s reflection will reveal that, instead, more interesting questions
consider the share and characteristics of households who are and are not preparing adequately, as
well as the extent to which they are undersaving. Framing the topic in this way inevitably leads
to an emphasis on the importance of differences across people and groups in terms of retirement
preparation. A “one-size-fits-all” answer to the question of how well people are doing is unlikely
to characterize the problems clearly.
A. Conceptual Issues
The first issue is to define the concept of adequate saving, which is surprisingly
controversial.3 For purposes of this paper, we define adequate saving as sufficient to provide a
household with an expected standard of living in retirement that is commensurate with its
standard of living during its working years. This definition has the advantage of conforming to
people’s “common sense” views of how they would like to live their lives.
But it comes with an important caveat. Our definition focuses on expected retirement
living standards relative to pre-retirement living standards. Many things can go wrong between
saving the right amount to maintain living standards on an expected basis and being able to
maintain living standards in actuality. Individuals face numerous risks in preparing for
retirement. Disability or layoffs may stop people from working as long as they had planned and
hence reduce their ability to accumulate wealth. Assets may accrue less than the expected rate of
return over time. A household may face disproportionate uninsured health care costs, including
those associated with long-term care.  People may face mental or physical declines that require
expensive daily assistance. Household members may live longer than expected, which, while
generally a good thing, has the side effect of generating higher saving needs to maintain pre-
3 For a recent review of the literature on the adequacy of retirement saving, see Mackenzie (forthcoming).
6retirement living standards. Alternatively, a person may become widowed and thus lose
important sources of income in retirement. Children may present unexpected financial burdens.
Many of these concerns relate to adequate insurance (for example, against risks
associated with disability, rate of return, inflation, health care costs, health status, lifespan, and
children’s circumstances) as opposed to adequate saving, but the two issues are related and both
are part of retirement preparation. Social Security, of course, is intended to cover only a portion
of adequate retirement income, not all of it. In the absence of well-functioning insurance
markets, people will to some extent need to save more in order to partially self-insure and be in a
position to mitigate the negative consequences of adverse outcomes.
A definition of adequate saving that allows people to self-insure against all risks is
probably an excessively high standard for all but the super-rich. But the distinction between
saving enough to maintain expected living standards in retirement and saving enough to insure
against all risks helps explain why there are different standards for “adequate saving.”
One approach to measuring whether people are saving adequately is to compare their
wealth accumulation behavior to that implied by an economic model that prescribes that people
save optimally.4 The standard economic approach is to equate the household’s discounted
marginal utility of consumption in each period. This approach has the advantage of being fully
consistent with economic theory, but it is not always easy for people to translate this approach
into practical advice, or to see where their preparations land them relative to the benchmark. And
the results are sensitive to model specification, especially in the presence of major changes, such
as those that occur in family size, marital status, or work status.5
4 Engen, Gale, and Uccello (1999); Gale, Scholz, and Seshadri (2009); Scholz, Seshadri, and Khitatrakun (2006).
5 Dushi et al. (2016).
7A more common, intuitive, and flexible approach focuses on replacement rates. A
replacement rate is a ratio of post-retirement income to pre-retirement income. The target
replacement rate that a household should aim for is one that will allow it to replicate its pre-
retirement living standards in retirement. It is essential to emphasize that 100 percent is not a
natural benchmark for an adequate replacement. The typical advice of financial planners is to
target a replacement rate of between 70 and 85 percent and some evidence suggests this is
consistent with optimal models of saving.6
Table 1 provides an extremely stylized example of how target replacement ratios in this
range might come about. Suppose a worker earns $100 in gross wages, and has $62 remaining
after work expenses, mortgage costs, retirement saving contributions, health insurance
premiums, payroll taxes, and federal and state income taxes. Suppose the worker reaches age 65,
pays off the mortgage, and retires. The payments for work expenses, the mortgage, 401(k)
contributions, payroll taxes, and health insurance stop (the last because the worker becomes
eligible for Medicare) and let’s say taxes fall by one-third (because income declines and because
there are currently benefits in the tax code for the elderly). That means the worker would only
need $70 per year in retirement to replace the living standard that $100 provided during working
years, or a 70 percent replacement rate.
This stylized example serves to show that adequate retirement income need not replace
100 percent of pre-retirement income and that there may be a sizable difference between saving
enough and saving “a lot.” For example, in the scenario above, if Social Security and a defined
benefit plan replaced two-thirds of the worker’s wages in retirement, very little additional saving
would be required to maintain pre-retirement living standards in retirement.
6 Scholz and Seshadri (2009); Engen, Gale, and Uccello (1999).
8Several qualifications are crucial. First, it is not clear what the “right” pre-retirement
wage should be for purposes of the calculation. Oft-used measures include final earnings, an
average of the highest three or five years of earnings, or average lifetime earnings. Empirical
measures of the target replacement rate are sensitive to which measure is used as the
denominator. Second, different households will have different target replacement rates. Factors
such as the presence of children during working years or increased health needs during
retirement years will influence how much spending is needed in retirement to maintain pre-
retirement living standards. The target replacement rate would be higher to the extent that pre-
retirement expenses on mortgages, health insurance, retirement contributions, and taxes were
lower, or to the extent that post-retirement health care needs or bequest motives were stronger.
Third, different households may want to include varying measures of assets as sources of
available retirement income. Some might want to tap housing equity, while others may choose
not to do so. For all of these reasons, the replacement rate needed to maintain pre-retirement
living standards in retirement will vary across households.
B. Evidence
Previous studies tend to focus on current retirees and older workers, rather than the
members of the younger generations, and have reached a wide variety of conclusions about the
adequacy of saving. Many of these differences are traceable to different underlying assumptions
regarding precisely the conceptual issues raised above.7 Specifically, studies are likely to find a
larger undersaving problem to the extent that they: use a target replacement rate based on the
highest three-year earnings a worker achieved as opposed to career average earnings; minimize
consumption needs during working years (for example, by excluding the role of children in
7 Congressional Budget Office (2017).
9household consumption); maximize consumption needs during retirement (for example, by
expecting the household to self-insure against all risks); or assume that only narrow measures of
net worth (for example, excluding housing wealth) can be used to fund retirement income.8
For example, to calculate the National Retirement Risk Index (NRRI), researchers at
Boston College first estimate the projected replacement rate (with average lifetime income as the
denominator) for each household in a nationally representative sample. They then calculate a
target replacement rate (the rate necessary to maintain pre-retirement living standards in
retirement) for each household and a projected actual replacement rate. The NRRI is the share of
households whose projected actual replacement rates are more than 10 percent (not percentage
points) below their target rates. In 2016, the most recent year for which the NRRI was
calculated, 50 percent of working-age households were classified as being at risk.9
In contrast, Scholz, Seshadri, and Khitatrakun (2006) develop an optimal savings model
that compares households’ optimal and actual wealth in order to ascertain whether they are
saving enough for retirement. These authors implicitly use a measure of lifetime earnings,
adjusted for family size, in the denominator of the replacement rate ratio. They find that most
households are saving adequately for retirement, with only 15.6 percent having wealth that is less
than their optimal targets.
Although previous research efforts reach different conclusions on the overall status of
retirement saving adequacy, two robust conclusions emerge. First, retirement saving status varies
across different groups. Members of racial and ethnic minorities tend to be less likely to be
8 Aon Hewitt (2012); Munnell, Hou, and Sanzenbacher (2016); Rhee (2013b).
9 For details of these calculations, see Munnell, Hou, and Sanzenbacher (2018a).
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saving adequately, as well as single-headed households, younger workers, those with fewer years
of formal education, those without a retirement plan, and those with lower incomes.10
Second, while many households appear to be saving enough to expect to maintain pre-
retirement living standards in retirement, virtually no one claims that many households are well-
insured against all risks. For example, Hurd and Rohwedder (2012) find that the risk of a health
shock reduces the share of the population that is adequately prepared for retirement (by their
definition) by 3 to 13 percentage points, depending on marital status and educational attainment.
Poterba, Venti, and Wise (2015) find that even among those who amass significant wealth, a
large health shock or death of a spouse can result in a significant decline in assets. VanDerhei
(2014) cites longevity risk and health care costs as significant threats to retirement saving.11
III. Intergenerational Comparisons
The millennial generation includes individuals born between 1981 and 1996.12 Members
of this group are between the ages of 22 and 37 as of 2018. By 2050, they will be between the
ages of 54 and 69. In 2019, Millennials will become the largest living generation in the US,
10 See, for example, Butricia, Iams, and Smith (2012), Engen, Gale, and Uccello (1999), Hurd and Rohwedder
(2012), John (2010), Pang and Warshawsky (2014), Rhee (2013a), Scholz, Seshadri, and Khitatrakun (2006),
VanDerhei (2014), VanDerhei and Copeland (2010).
11 Studies that use administrative data often tend to find more income among retirees than studies that employ
survey data with self-reported income. For example, based on a comparison of responses to the Current Population
Survey Annual Social and Economic Supplement (CPS ASEC) and information from administrative records on
earnings and income from Social Security and the Internal Revenue Service, Bee and Mitchell (2017) show that
individuals underreport their income from defined benefit plans and retirement account withdrawals. Brady et al.
(2017) use Internal Revenue Service Statistics of Income panel data, supplemented by information returns, to show
that individuals do not experience a reduction in disposable income after beginning to receive Social Security.
However, Chen, Munnell, and Sanzenbacher (2018) find that the extent of understatement of wealth is minimal in
the Health and Retirement Study and the Survey of Consumer Finances.
12 Dimock (2018). Various definitions of the millennial generation include those born between the early 1980s and
the early 2000s. The Census Bureau (unofficially) defines Millennials as the cohort born between 1982 and 2000
(US Census Bureau 2015).
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overtaking the Baby Boomers, and will make up about a quarter of the population.13 They are
also more racially diverse than prior generations: 44 percent of Millennials identify as a minority
(a race or ethnicity other than non-Hispanic white), compared to 25 percent of individuals aged
21 to 36 in 1985.14 Given the experience of prior generations, documented above, we now turn
to examining how cross-generational differences affect Millennials’ retirement prospects.
A. Current Status
Focusing first on their current status, today’s young adults have accumulated less wealth
than most previous generations at the same age. Figure 1 shows tabulations of Federal Reserve
Board data from the triennial Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), spanning the period 1989 to
2016. In the latter year, Millennials were between the ages of 20 and 35. We examine net worth
accumulation among 20-35 year olds in each of the previous SCF years (with all wealth data
reported in 2016 dollars). Because wealth accumulation patterns may not be particularly
informative for people who are still in college, we also examine wealth patterns among 25-35
year olds in each year.
The figure shows that, using either age-group comparison, median wealth among
Millennials in 2016 was lower than among similarly aged cohorts in any year from 1989 to 2007.
The Great Recession in 2007-9 significantly reduced household wealth, which has been slowly
recovering since then. Median wealth among Millennials was about 25 percent lower in 2016
than among similarly-aged households in 2007. The percentage declines in mean wealth are even
larger.15
13 Fry (2017a). The Baby Boomers are generally considered to include those born between 1946 and 1964.
14 Fry, Igielnik, and Patten (2018).
15 Dettling, Hsu, and Llanes (2018) provide further detail on wealth accumulation trends between 2007 and 2016.
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Considering components of wealth (not shown), Millennials had more debt than similarly
aged people in 1989 but have about the same level as the 2001 cohort. The latter result may be
surprising, given the well-publicized growth of student loans, but Millennials have less credit
card and other debt than prior generations.16
Focusing on retirement wealth specifically, Figure 2 shows that, relative to similarly aged
people, Millennials have about the same coverage rate for defined benefit pensions (DB) and
defined contribution plans from 2004 on, but lower DC coverage than the 1995-2001 cohort and
sharply lower DB coverage relative to that in the late 1980s. Median DC balances among
account holders has fallen since 2007.17
All of the results above likely overstate the relative wealth position of Millennials
because of the interaction of three factors. First, the SCF does not survey dependent members of
households, including Millennials who live with their parents. Second, the share of Millennials
living with their parents is higher than the share of similarly aged people in prior generations.
Among 25-34 year olds, 16 percent lived with their parents in 2016, compared to 11 percent in
1990 and 10 percent in 2000.18 Third, some formal evidence (as well as casual observations)
suggests that young adults who are living at their parents’ home are doing less well economically
than other young adults. Among those aged 25-34 and living at home in 2016, 26 percent were
neither employed nor attending school.19 Less educated people are less likely to live
16 Looney and Yannelis (2018).
17 Dettling and Hsu (2014) examine retirement saving trends for people aged 18-31 in the successive SCFs. They
find that Millennials in 2013 were just as likely to have a defined contribution retirement account as similarly aged
people in 2001. Millennials had higher median balances, conditional on ownership (by about $2,000), but they had
lower participation in defined benefit plans.
18 Fry (2017b).
19 Fry (2017b).
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independently and those with higher wages are more likely to do so.
Between 1989 and 2016, the distribution of wealth widened significantly (Figure 3). For
example, for 25-35 year olds, average net worth in the bottom 25 percent of the distribution fell
from about -$1,200 in 1989 to -$5,000 in 2007 and to -$20,000 in 2016. Over the same period,
average wealth in the top 10 percent of the distribution skyrocketed, rising from $1.9 million in
1989 to $3.3 million in 2007 to $4.8 million in 2016. These patterns are consistent with the
heterogeneity in preparation for retirement seen for other generations and noted above.
B. Future Status
Understanding the future saving behavior of the millennial generation will prove essential
for addressing future retirement saving adequacy issues. Looking forward, Millennials face a
distinctive set of issues and circumstances that will affect their ability to save for retirement,
including both advantages and disadvantages compared to prior generations.
1. Advantages
a. Education
Millennials start out with the advantage of having the most formal education of any
generation in history. Over 60 percent of adult Millennials have attended at least some college,
compared to 46 percent of the Baby Boomer generation when they were the same age.20 Rising
educational attainment among women drives this difference.21
Having more education will make it easier to save for retirement. First, the higher wages
that come with higher education will give households more opportunities to save. Second, people
20 Council of Economic Advisers (2014).
21 Johnson et al. (2017).
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with more education tend to save more of their income, controlling for income.22 Third, people
with higher education levels tend to have later retirement ages since they tend to have less
physically demanding jobs, are healthier, and receive fringe benefits in addition to wages that
may incentivize them to stay in the labor force.23 The overarching societal trend towards white-
collar work may further increase average retirement ages for similar reasons. Good health status
is also highly correlated with decisions to work longer. 24 Working longer, of course, makes it
easier to finance adequate retirement saving.
On the other hand, higher education and income may make adequate saving more
difficult to achieve in some ways. For example, Social Security benefits are progressive—
replacing a smaller amount of average lifetime earnings as average lifetime earnings rise. And
those who are better educated, and in better health, tend to live longer, meaning that they have a
longer retirement period to finance, holding retirement age constant.
b. Longer careers due to change in type of retirement plan
Since the 1980s, the share of people participating in defined benefit (DB) plans has
decreased while participation in defined contribution plans (DC) has increased (Figure 2). At the
same time, the overall share of the workforce participating in any plan has remained relatively
constant.25
This trend is expected to continue, implying that today’s younger workers will have
higher DC coverage than previous generations and lower DB coverage. This will likely lead to
22 Dynan, Skinner, and Zeldes (2004).
23 Burtless (2013).
24 Munnell (2015).
25 Gale and John (2017).
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later retirement for Millennials relative to previous generations, which would make it easier to
accumulate funds necessary to finance retirement. Evidence suggests that DB plans often
encourage comparatively early retirement through built-in incentives that maximize pension
wealth at relatively early retirement ages.26 Since the 1980s the average retirement age has risen
after decades of decline, consistent with the decline of DB plans and rise of DC plans.27
As with better education, however, the shift to DC is not an unambiguous gain for
retirement saving adequacy. Greater DC coverage and less DB coverage shifts much of the
planning burden and investment risk from the employer to the employee, as discussed further
below.
2. Disadvantages
Despite having some advantages relative to previous generations, the Millennials face a
variety of obstacles and concerns that increase their chances—in absolute terms and relative to
previous generations—of saving too little.
a. Early-career labor market
The early-career labor market experienced by many of the Millennials has been
dominated by the Great Recession and the tepid pace of recovery for several years after. The
growth path of GDP has never recovered to the full-employment trend that existed before the
Great Recession.28 The weak job market and low overall labor force participation that existed at
26 Kotlikoff and Wise (1984); Stock and Wise (1990).
27 Hou et al. (2017); Morisi (2016); Munnell (2015). The rise in the average retirement age is also consistent with
the gradual increase in the full retirement age in Social Security that was enacted in 1983 (Song and Manchester
2007) and more generally with the evolution of retirement incentives embedded in social security and private
retirement plans (Coile 2018).
28 Congressional Budget Office (2018).
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the beginning of their careers has probably adversely affected Millennials’ career earnings paths.
Research shows that entering the labor force during an economic downturn depresses long-run
earnings.29 Evidence from the Great Depression further reveals that those who experience poor
macroeconomic trends while they are young are less likely to take on significant financial risk,
invest in the stock market, or own bonds.30
b. The rise of contingent jobs
The evolution of the labor force towards contingent jobs will also complicate retirement
saving for Millennials.31 In traditional employer-employee relationships, workers earn a salary or
wage and receive fringe benefits, potentially including employer contributions to retirement
plans. Contingent workers, on the other hand, work on an ad hoc basis and are paid based on the
service or good they provide. They may or may not work full-time. Examples include Uber
drivers, consultants, and contractors. Using a broad definition, there could be almost 20 million
contingent workers in the United States.32 Among full-time workers, these individuals have
median weekly earnings about 30 percent lower than traditional workers and face a variety of
barriers to retirement saving. Conventional retirement savings mechanisms, such as payroll
deductions and employer matching contributions, are not readily available. As a result, they are
half as likely to have access to a work-provided retirement plan.33 While non-employer based
29 Welch (1979); Kahn (2010).
30 Malmendier and Nagel (2011).
31 Gale, Holmes, and John (2018); Harris and Krueger (2015); Katz and Krueger (2016).
32 Gale, Holmes, and John (2018).
33 Gale, Holmes, and John (2018).
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retirement options such as IRAs are available to this group, only a small percentage participate.34
Although a recent survey suggests that contingent work is not rising as fast as some had thought,
it is nevertheless the case that Millennials face higher probabilities of doing contingent work than
previous generations.35
c. The added risks and responsibility of defined contribution plans
As noted above, participants in DC plans tend to work longer than participants in DB
plans; other things equal, longer working careers should improve the adequacy of retirement
saving. But other structural features of DC plans may lead to lower retirement incomes. First, to
set up a DC plan, employees must make significantly more decisions regarding contribution
levels, asset allocations, and asset drawdown. This freedom may actually serve to undermine
retirement security if poor decisions are made.36 Automatic mechanisms that govern enrollment,
escalation of contributions, investment allocation, and rollovers can reduce these problems.
Second, workers bear all of the investment risk in most DC plans.
d. Delayed life decisions
Compared to previous generations, Millennials are more likely to delay homeownership,
marriage, and child bearing. Young adults currently have the lowest homeownership rate of any
similarly aged generation since at least 1989 (Figure 4). The average age of first marriage has
increased from age 21 for women (24 for men) in 1975 to age 27 (29) in 2016 (Figure 5).37 The
age at which parents have their first child has increased over time as well, from 22 in 1975 to 26
34 Government Accountability Office (2015).
35 US Bureau of Labor Statistics (2018).
36 Poterba (2014).
37 United States Census Bureau (2017).
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in 2014.38 The changes in these behavioral patterns are so large that there is debate over whether
to label “emerging adulthood” as a new stage of life between childhood and adulthood.39 These
trends, in turn, may delay the onset of retirement saving if people feel the need to “get settled” by
purchasing a house and raising children before beginning to think about saving for retirement.
e. Increasing lifespan
Just as delayed life choices may postpone substantial retirement saving, increasing
lifespans make it harder to maintain standards of living in retirement, other things equal. Over
the past five decades, the average life expectancy at birth has increased from 67 to 76 for males
and from 73 to 81 for females. These increases are not borne equally, however. Those at the top
of the income distribution have received almost all of the increase, while life expectancy for
those at the bottom has remained constant or has possibly even declined slightly.40 If households
live longer and plan to maintain their pre-retirement standard of living in retirement, they will
either need to work longer or save more.
f. Addressing long-term federal fiscal imbalances
The federal government faces a long-term debt problem that will create pressure to cut
spending and raise taxes. By the end of 2018, federal public debt will be 78 percent as large as
gross domestic product (GDP), more than twice as large as the average ratio for the 50 years
before the Great Recession. Under current policy assumptions, the public debt-GDP ratio will
exceed 106 percent by 2028 and 200 percent by 2048. Just to keep the debt-GDP ratio in 2048 at
its current level would require a combination of immediate and permanent spending cuts or tax
38 Matthews and Hamilton (2016); United States Census Bureau (2017).
39 Vespa (2017).
40 National Academy of Sciences (2015).
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increases totaling 4.2 percent of GDP. This is equivalent to a 22 percent cut in non-interest
spending or a 25 percent increase in tax revenue relative to current levels.41 Even greater cuts
would be required to lower the ratio to its 50-year average rate. The longer policymakers wait to
institute fiscal adjustments, the larger the adjustments will have to be in each given year, and the
greater sacrifices Millennials will have to make. Changes to Social Security, Medicare, and taxes
will be particularly relevant to addressing the long-term fiscal imbalance. If such fiscal
adjustments are made over the next few decades, it seems highly likely that Millennials, who will
then be in their prime earning years, will bear a significant amount of the burden.
g. Low rates of return
Real interest rates fell steadily from the mid-1990s, though they have risen slightly in the
last few years. Many reasons have been put forward for the decline, and most of them suggest
the low rates will persist somewhat.42 One explanation, popularized by former Treasury
Secretary Larry Summers, involves a lack of aggregate demand due to the Great Recession and
secular stagnation post-recession.43 Other explanations include a worldwide savings glut and a
flight to safety.44
To the extent that such trends continue or do not reverse, and display themselves in lower
overall asset returns, it will prove harder for Millennials to accumulate sufficient retirement
wealth.45 With a given pattern of retirement contributions over time, a lower rate of return will
41 Auerbach, Gale, and Krupkin (2018).
42 Elmendorf and Sheiner (2016).
43 Summers (2016).
44 Bernanke (2007, 2015).
45 Fichtner and Seligman (2017); Mitchell, Clark, and Maurer (2018).
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result in a smaller accumulation of balances during the accumulation phase of retirement saving.
With a given balance at the point of retirement, lower interest rates will result in smaller feasible
payouts—for example, through an annuity—during the withdrawal phase of retirement saving.
C. Evidence
One early assessment (Johnson et al. 2017) attempts to project future retirement income
for older Millennials and Generation Xers. The authors find that median income at age 70 for
members of these groups will be higher than that of prior generations, though a smaller share of
individuals will have enough to maintain their pre-retirement standard of living. These results, as
the authors describe, are uncertain, given that today’s young adults still have decades of work
until their retirement.
IV. Wealth Accumulation and Racial and Ethnic Minorities
A. Projected Population Trends
Table 2 shows U.S. Census Bureau (2018) projections of the composition of the future
population. The United States will be a “majority-minority” country by 2050, where minority is
defined as any race other than non-Hispanic white. The share of the population identifying as
white only is projected to fall from 61.3 to 47.8 percent. As a share of the population, all races
other than white are projected to grow or remain the same. The share of the population
identifying as Hispanic is projected to rise from increase from 17.8 to 25.7 percent. The black-
only share of the population is projected to increase from 12.4 to 13.3 percent; the American
Indian and Alaska Native share is expected to stay relatively stable around 0.7 percent; the Asian
share is expected to grow from 5.5 to 8.2 percent; the Native Hawaiian and Pacific Islander share
is projected to stay steady around 0.2 percent; and the share of people of two or more races is
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projected to increase from 2.1 to 4.1 percent.46
The projected growth of the minority population relative to the U.S. population as a
whole will present new challenges and opportunities for retirement saving. As discussed above,
the literature on the adequacy of retirement saving shows significant intragenerational
heterogeneity in preparation for retirement. Within generations, minorities appear to be at a
disadvantage with regard to saving adequately for retirement compared to their non-minority
counterparts. We provide further evidence on these issues below.
B. Descriptive data
Appendix Table 1 reports characteristics of various racial and ethnic groups surveyed in
the Federal Reserve’s Survey of Consumer Finances. In general, the data show that whites have
higher incomes than blacks or Hispanics, who have roughly similar incomes on average. Whites
have higher rates of college graduation than blacks, who in turn have higher rates than Hispanics.
Marriage is more prevalent among whites and Hispanics than blacks. In the samples, whites tend
to be somewhat older on average than blacks, who in turn are older than Hispanics.
Whites are more likely than other groups to have a retirement account.47 As of 2016, 65.9
percent of whites have an account, compared with 37.8 percent of blacks, 34.1 percent of
Hispanics of any race, and 59.6 percent of people of other races. Overall, 56.5 percent of the
population has a retirement plan.48 Controlling for observable characteristics, Hasler, Lusardi,
46 By 2050, the foreign-born share of the population will increase from 13.6 to 16.8 percent. The share of the
population 65 and older will rise from about 15.2 percent to 22.1 percent. The share of the population under 18 will
decrease from 22.8 to 20.1 percent, and the share between 18 and 64 will decrease from 62 to 57.9 percent (United
States Census Bureau 2018).
47 The working age population is defined as those aged 25 to 64. Ownership of a retirement account includes having
a nonzero balance in any of the following, as defined by the SCF: IRAs, Keoghs, thrift-type accounts, and future and
current account-type pensions. See also Rhee (2013b).
48 Harvey (2017). Statistics are for workers aged 18 to 64 who work in the private sector. In this case, CPS data is
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and Oggero (2018) show that whites are less likely to be “financially fragile,” as they define it.
C. Regression specification
We estimate regression of the form
W = α + βX +γR + ε
Where W is a measure of wealth, X is a vector of household characteristics, including education,
marital status, sex (for singles), income and age categories, and R is a series of racial/ethnic
indicators (black, Hispanic, and non-white other, with white as the omitted category).49 We
employ cross-section data from each of the ten survey years the SCF has been administered
(triennially from 1989 to 2016) and estimate least squares (LS) and median (Least Absolute
Deviation, or LAD) regressions, each with robust estimation techniques. Thompson and Suarez
(2015) examine similar issues and provide wealth decompositions using the 1989-2013 SCFs.50
In the text, we present regressions using the level of wealth as the dependent variable. In
the Appendix, we present results that use the inverse hyperbolic sine of wealth as the dependent
variable. We emphasize that the coefficient on race shows differences in wealth accumulation
after controlling for various factors but should not be interpreted as an estimate of the impact of
racial discrimination.
The LS regressions in Table 3 show that black households tend to have lower net worth
used as an illustrative example of disparities in retirement saving by demographics. Studies linking CPS survey data
with administrative data find that Americans tend to underestimate their retirement income (Bee and Mitchell 2017).
Many who receive such income fail to report it. Other studies suggest that self-reports of retirement plan
participation are underestimated as well (Dushi and Honig 2015). Thus, the estimates presented here may represent a
lower bound of access to and participation in retirement plans.
49 Regressions using a variable called “normal income” instead of income yielded similar results.
50 Other studies of racial wealth gaps include Altonji and Doraszelski (2005), Barsky et al. (2002), Masterson et al.
(2009), Pew (2011), Scholz and Levine (2003), and Shapiro, Meschede, and Osoro (2013).
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than white households, controlling for other factors.51 In the 2016 SCF, controlling for other
factors, black households had on average $124,000 less net worth than white households. This
difference may have increased over time. The black-white differences in wealth in the 1989,
1992, and 1995 cross-sections are smaller than the 2016 difference, with p-values ranging from
.035 to .105.
This finding should be qualified carefully. Certainly, reductions in black-white
differences over time in educational attainment and in wages should serve to reduce black-white
wealth differences. Our results address a different point. We show that—controlling for any
changes in education, wages, and other household characteristics—the difference in wealth
between blacks and whites may well have increased over time. Additional results presented
below support this conclusion.
Households where the head is of Hispanic origin do not generally have statistically
significantly different net worth from whites, controlling for other factors.
Other non-white individuals, on average, had significantly lower net worth than whites in
three of the SCF years (2004, 2010, and 2016). This difference appears to have increased over
time, with the coefficients on the 1989, 1992, 1995 regressions significantly smaller (in absolute
value) than the coefficient in the 2016 regression.
In all of these regressions, however, the relevant sample sizes are fairly small, so precise
estimation is difficult. To help address the concern with sample size, we also pool the data across
survey years, adding a control for the survey year, with results shown in Table 4.
As in the cross-section results, blacks have lower net worth, controlling for other factors.
The coefficients are larger in absolute value in the 2010-2016 specification than in the 1989-
51 This finding is consistent with Emmons and Ricketts (2017), who show that differences in observable variables
cannot fully explain minorities’ wealth accumulation relative to whites.
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2007 specification, confirming the finding above about widening black-white wealth differences,
controlling for other factors.
Households where the head is of Hispanic origin do not have a significantly different net
worth in any of the specifications. Those who do not identify as white, black, or Hispanic have
significantly lower net worth than whites in each specification and the difference has grown over
time.
Since wealth tends to be distributed in a skewed manner, we also report LAD regressions
to remove the impact of outliers. The regressions yield similar results to the LS findings, though
of a smaller magnitude.
In cross-section results reported in Table 5, the typical black household had $43,262 less
in wealth than the typical white household, controlling for other factors. The difference in wealth
has increased over time, again conditional on observable factors.
The LAD regressions also show that the typical household with a head of Hispanic origin
has less net worth than white households in several of the survey years, particularly in 2013 and
2016. The results suggest that wealth differences between whites and Hispanics may be
increasing over time. Results are mixed for other non-white individuals, but the sample size for
this group is relatively small, so precise estimation is difficult.
Table 6 reports LAD regressions using data pooled across survey years. The results are
qualitatively similar to earlier findings. Black households have less wealth than white households
and the difference has grown over time, although it is smaller in the LAD regressions than in LS
regressions.
C. Discussion
Our finding that differences in wealth between whites and minorities appears to have
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increased over time is consistent with a substantial body of literature.52 The increase in the gap,
at least over the past decade, appears to be due to the decline in housing wealth during the Great
Recession, which impacted low-wealth households more than high-wealth households.53
The implications of the results for the Millennial generation are concerning. Chetty et al.
(2018) find that black households have lower income, on average, than white households.
Moreover, given parental income, they find that black children have lower rates of upward
mobility and higher rates of downward mobility than white children. Rates of upward mobility
for Hispanics are lower than for whites but higher than for black households. Their results
suggest that closing the income gap over time between whites and minorities will be difficult.
Building off those results, our findings imply that minorities that have less wealth than whites,
even after controlling for income (and education, age, and marital status). Therefore, our results
suggest that, even if the income gap between groups were eventually reduced or eliminated, that
would not in itself be sufficient to ensure the adequacy of saving for minority households—there
would still be a retirement saving gap between whites and minorities.
It is unclear, however, to what extent the wealth accumulation patterns of minorities in
the past provides a reliable guide to their wealth accumulation patterns in the future. As the
economy evolves, one can expect the economic experience of minorities to change. For example,
relative to minorities in the past, minorities in the future may well live in neighborhoods with
different characteristics, go to different types of schools, and have different experiences with
52See, for example, Taylor et al. (2011), Kochhar and Fry (2014), McKernan et al. (2014), Shapiro, Meschede, and
Osoro (2014), Thompson and Suarez (2015), and Wolff (2018). Munnell, Hou, and Sanzenbacher (2018b) show
that differences in the proportion of households saving adequately for retirement (a different measure than the
“Wealth gap” measures used in the studies cited above) fell for blacks relative to whites from 2007 to 2016, but rose
for Hispanics relative to whites. Hispanics were particuarly hard hit by declines in housing prices in the Great
Recession.
53McKernan et al. (2014); Shapiro, Meschede, and Osoro (2014); Wolff (2018).
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mentors, discrimination, marriage, child bearing and so on. This could, in principle, help
minorities accumulate more wealth relative to whites than in the past. However, the results above
show that over the past 30 years, the results the gap has widened, after controlling for observable
characteristics.
V. Conclusion
Predicting retirement saving patterns as of 2050 is an exercise in uncertainty. There is
clearly cause for concern. First, many members of the current generation of retirees and near-
retirees are not saving very much. Second, Millennials will face a number of “headwinds” in
accumulating enough saving to finance adequate retirement. Third, the projected rise in the
minority population will reduce retirement saving adequacy, if current trends persist. On the
other hand, Millennials possess a few major advantages over previous generations in preparing
for retirement and it is not at all clear that the wealth accumulation patterns of minority
households will remain constant if their economic situation changes.
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Table 1. Calculating a Target Replacement Rate
Pre-Retirement Post-Retirement
Wages $100 0
Health Insurance $6 0
401(k) Contributions $5 0
Mortgage Payment $5 0
Work Expenses $2.35 0
Payroll Taxes $7.65 0
Federal and State Taxes $12 $8
Other Consumption $62 $62
Target Replacement Rate -- $70
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Table 2. Projected Share of Population by Race and Hispanic Origin by Year (%)
White Hispanic Black Asian 2+ races AIAN* NHPI**
2016 61.3 17.8 12.4 5.5 2.1 0.7 0.2
2020 59.7 18.7 12.5 5.8 2.3 0.7 0.2
2030 55.8 21.1 12.8 6.7 2.8 0.7 0.2
2040 51.7 23.5 13.0 7.5 3.4 0.7 0.2
2050 47.8 25.7 13.3 8.2 4.1 0.7 0.2
Source: Author’s calculations using U.S. Census Bureau (2018).
Note: All percentages for a given race represent the share of that race that is not Hispanic. All Hispanics are
captured in the Hispanic column.
* American Indian/Alaska Native
** Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander
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Table 3. Net Worth Regressions (Least Squares)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 2016
Black -42,109* -40,433*** -56,846*** -66,146*** -96,659*** -97,979*** -78,393*** -141,470*** -83,542*** -124,142***
(23,206) (13,804) (18,309) (19,132) (31,543) (27,485) (29,495) (26,428) (23,857) (37,193)
P- value,
coefficient =
2016 value 0.061 0.035 0.105 0.166 0.573 0.572 0.335 0.704 0.358 N.A.
Hispanic -6,333 23,809 -34,760 29,801 -5,895 -25,377 70,958* -58,587** 1,298 42,575
(26,919) (24,879) (28,864) (26,233) (38,400) (40,387) (42,880) (29,682) (28,004) (37,425)
P-value,
coefficient =
2016 value 0.289 0.676 0.102 0.780 0.366 0.217 0.618 0.034 0.377 N.A.
Non-White 48,796 21,532 -20,803 -66,383 -160,583 -229,736*** -147,826 -279,171*** -69,021 -255,881**
other (89,674) (49,493) (50,361) (91,136) (134,387) (86,197) (115,956) (87,955) (88,076) (105,779)
P-value,
coefficient =
2016 value
0.028 0.018 0.045 0.175 0.577 0.848 0.491 0.866 0.175 N.A.
N 3,143 3,906 4,299 4,305 4,442 4,519 4,417 6,482 6,015 6,248
R-squared 0.114 0.084 0.088 0.094 0.131 0.102 0.104 0.099 0.093 0.071
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve (2017).
Control variables: Education level category (Less than high school diploma, high school diploma, some college, bachelor’s degree, graduate degree); Marital status; Sex
of single heads of household; Income category ($0-19,999, $20,000-49,999, $50,000-99,999, $100,000-199,999, $200,000+); Age category (0-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54,
65-74, 75+).
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
30
Table 4. Pooled Net Worth Regressions (Least Squares)
(1) (2) (3)
1989-2016 1989-2007 2010-2016
Black -90,972*** -71,877*** -117,903***
(8,626) (9,386) (17,292)
P-value,
coefficient =
2016 value N.A. 0.012 N.A.
Hispanic -7,845 3,575 -7,399
(11,002) (13,499) (18,635)
P-value,
coefficient =
2016 value N.A. 0.303 N.A.
Non-White -112,807*** -70,197** -199,954***
Other (29,078) (33,546) (54,600)
P-value,
coefficient =
2016 value N.A. 0.045 N.A.
N 47,776 29,031 18,745
R-squared 0.091 0.102 0.082
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve (2017).
Control variables: Same as in Tables 3 and 5, plus year effects.
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 5. Net Worth Regressions (Least Absolute Deviations)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 2016
Black -29,966*** -20,971*** -21,259*** -19,532*** -22,585*** -31,104*** -23,935*** -21,602*** -36,176*** -43,262***
(4,534) (3,181) (3,719) (3,123) (3,890) (6,478) (5,844) (4,480) (2,927) (3,019)
P-value,
coefficient =
2016 value 0.019 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.113 0.010 <0.001 0.088 N.A.
Hispanic -25,656*** -8,703 -14,384*** -9,866 -9,010* -5,346 -3,439 -6,724 -13,124*** -23,161***
(9,338) (5,808) (5,113) (6,065) (5,043) (5,973) (6,960) (4,466) (3,823) (4,457)
P-value,
coefficient =
2016 value 0.665 0.028 0.237 0.053 0.024 0.017 0.025 0.004 0.069 N.A.
Non-White -12,710 -11,955*** -23,216*** -23,200 -523.9 -25,554 -34,624*** -32,870*** -23,177 -8,501
other (9,025) (3,212) (6,717) (17,139) (30,931) (19,163) (11,401) (9,290) (15,789) (6,512)
P-value,
coefficient =
2016 value 0.786 0.611 0.052 0.438 0.741 0.287 0.192 0.049 0.382 N.A.
N 3,143 3,906 4,299 4,305 4,442 4,519 4,417 6,482 6,015 6,248
Pseudo .180 .184 .143 .167 .166 .163 .158 .163 .168 .160
R-squared
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve (2017).
Control variables: Education level category (Less than high school diploma, high school diploma, some college, bachelor’s degree, graduate degree); Marital status; Sex
of single heads of household; Income category ($0-19,999, $20,000-49,999, $50,000-99,999, $100,000-199,999, $200,000+); Age category (0-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54,
65-74, 75+).
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 6. Pooled Net Worth Regressions (Least Absolute Deviations)
(1) (2) (3)
1989-2016 1989-2007 2010-2016
Black -26,419*** -23,339*** -33,809***
(1,171) (1,394) (1,714)
P-value,
coefficient =
2016 value N.A. <0.001 N.A.
Hispanic -12,422*** -10,292*** -14,670***
(1,553) (1,706) (2,521)
P-value,
coefficient =
2016 value N.A. 0.129 N.A.
Non-White -17,827*** -18,695*** -17,158***
Other (3,185) (2,621) (5,705)
P-value,
coefficient =
2016 value N.A. 0.643 N.A.
N 47,776 29,031 18,745
Pseudo
R-squared 0.160 0.161 0.163
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve (2017).
Control variables: Same as in Tables 3 and 5, plus year effects.
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure 1. Median Net Worth Among Young Households
(1989-2016)
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Retirement account assets include the value of IRAs, Keoghs, thrift-type accounts,
and future and current account-type pensions.
Figure 2. DB and DC Plan Ownership Among 25 to 35
Cohort (1989-2016)
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Figure 3. Mean Net Worth by Percentile (ages 25-35)
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Figure 4. Share of Young Households Owning a Home
(1989-2016)
25-35 years old 20-35 years old
37
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
A
ge
Source: US Census Bureau (2017).
Figure 5. Median Age at First Marriage (1970-2016)
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Appendix
While the regressions in the text use the level of wealth (in 2016 dollars) as the dependent
variable, the regressions in the Appendix employ the inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS) of wealth.
This transformation has been used in previous literature (for example, Gale and Pence 2006,
Pence 2006, Thompson and Suarez 2015). The transformation approximates the logarithm of
wealth for large positive values of wealth and is also able to address zero or negative values of
wealth, which occur frequently in the data. The IHS transformation yields estimates of
proportional differences in wealth, rather than the differences in levels generated by the
regressions in the main text.
More formally, if θ is a scaling parameter and w is a measure of wealth, the inverse
hyperbolic sine of wealth can be written as θ−1 sinh−1 (θw) = θ−1 ln[θw + (θ2 w2 + 1)1/2]. This
symmetric function is linear around the origin but approximates the logarithm for larger values
of wealth. To see this, note that if w is large, ln[θw + (θ2 w2 + 1)1/2] ≈ ln2θ + lnw, which is simply
a vertical displacement of the logarithm. Following previous research, we set θ = 0.0001.54 When
multiplied by this scaling parameter, coefficients from an inverse hyperbolic sine specification,
like coefficients from a logarithmic specification, can be interpreted as the effect of a change in a
given variable on the percentage change in wealth, for wealth values that are sufficiently large.55
Appendix Tables 2-5 provide regression results using the IHS transformation of wealth
that parallel Tables 3-6 in the main text. Several patterns in the IHS estimates merit attention.
54 Using maximum likelihood, Burbidge, Magee, and Robb (1988) find that 0.0000872 (or 0.0001, rounded) is the
optimal value for the scaling parameter for net worth in their ordinary least squares specification; Pence (2002) finds
that 0.0001 is the optimal value for her median regression specification. Kennickell and Sundén (1997) also use this
parameter value for net worth.
55 See Pence (2006) for further exposition of this result and Burbidge, Magee, and Robb (1988) for more
information on this transformation.
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First, controlling for demographic factors, black-white wealth differences are large. In 2016, for
example, controlling for other factors, blacks had more than 50 percent less wealth than whites at
the mean and the median of the distribution. The estimates provide marginal support for the idea
that the differences have grown over time in Appendix Tables 2 and 4 and strong support for the
view in Appendix Tables 3 and 5. Second, the effects for Hispanics are smaller than for blacks
but the Hispanic coefficients under the IHS transformation are much more precisely estimated
than under the level-of-wealth regressions in the main text. Third, the effects for “other” groups
are smaller than for blacks and Hispanics and are not precisely estimated.
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Appendix Table 1. Demographic Characteristics by Year and Race/Ethnicity
A. Average Age B. Share Who Are College Grads (%)
Black Hispanic Other White Black Hispanic Other White
1989 47.3 42.5 41.9 49 1989 11.0 6.5 34.1 26.3
1992 45.8 41.6 44.8 49.8 1992 17.0 6.5 31.6 30.8
1995 45.8 40.2 45.4 49.7 1995 12.4 9.4 32.9 27.9
1998 46 40.7 43.7 50.1 1998 14.0 12.1 32.7 29.9
2001 45.4 40.7 45.5 50.6 2001 13.7 12.5 49.1 32.0
2004 47.7 42.2 45.8 51 2004 20.1 8.9 51.6 34.0
2007 45.7 41.3 44.4 52.2 2007 19.6 12.1 54.7 31.4
2010 48.1 42.4 48.4 52.4 2010 19.9 15.3 48.6 34.1
2013 48.8 44.2 45.9 53.1 2013 21.6 11.8 53.2 35.9
2016 49.4 45.8 45 53.7 2016 22.1 17.2 54.3 38.1
C. Share Who Are Married (%) D. Average Income (2016$)
Black Hispanic Other White Black Hispanic Other White
1989 28.0 60.5 57.9 63.0 1989 36,815 39,742 58,884 86,229
1992 35.7 59.6 54.8 61.2 1992 39,948 38,383 71,891 74,108
1995 35.8 69.7 62.0 61.3 1995 36,206 47,993 72,883 77,506
1998 36.0 69.8 66.6 60.7 1998 41,577 47,620 83,136 86,656
2001 38.2 61.8 61.7 64.1 2001 50,495 52,716 83,761 105,968
2004 33.6 67.7 68.5 60.6 2004 49,326 50,540 98,618 101,369
2007 41.3 68.4 66.4 60.2 2007 53,087 55,349 104,161 110,394
2010 39.4 61.6 63.6 60.8 2010 46,871 55,366 107,399 97,553
2013 36.6 63.0 63.6 60.1 2013 43,785 47,123 95,831 105,203
2016 36.4 59.6 60.1 60.8 2016 54,949 57,396 112,310 119,842
E. Share with Retirement Accounts (%) F. Share of Population (%)*
Black Hispanic Other White Black Hispanic Other White
1989 16.5 16.1 25.0 43.3 1989 12.8 8 4.4 74.8
1992 24.2 19.2 28.5 45.2 1992 12.7 7.4 4.5 75.3
1995 27.8 31.9 40.2 49.3 1995 12.8 5.7 4 77.6
1998 34.5 22.4 46.0 54.3 1998 11.8 7.1 3.3 77.8
2001 39.7 31.8 48.2 58.0 2001 13 7.9 2.8 76.3
2004 32.3 25.7 51.7 55.9 2004 13.6 9.2 3.6 73.6
2007 37.0 32.0 63.7 57.5 2007 12.6 9.4 4.1 73.9
2010 32.6 27.8 51.9 57.3 2010 13.8 10.7 4.6 70.8
2013 34.0 26.0 49.4 56.0 2013 14.6 10.6 4.7 70.1
2016 34.0 31.2 55.6 59.6 2016 15.8 11.3 4.8 68
Source: Authors' calculations using Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2017).
* Share of population is estimated by calculating the weighted share of observations in the SCF for each race in each year.
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Appendix Table 2. Net Worth Regressions (Least Squares, Inverse Hyperbolic Sine Transformation)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 2016
Black -0.452*** -0.402*** -0.435*** -0.352*** -0.445*** -0.452*** -0.413*** -0.453*** -0.552*** -0.537***
(0.107) (0.078) (0.077) (0.079) (0.077) (0.086) (0.086) (0.071) (0.072) (0.068)
P-value,
coefficient =
2016 value 0.185 0.014 0.052 0.001 0.076 0.120 0.029 0.090 0.746 N.A.
Hispanic -0.481*** -0.343*** -0.322*** -0.310*** -0.364*** -0.284*** -0.147 -0.292*** -0.323*** -0.322***
(0.119) (0.110) (0.120) (0.103) (0.091) (0.089) (0.097) (0.080) (0.084) (0.0766)
P-value,
coefficient =
2016 value 0.059 0.818 0.996 0.886 0.596 0.644 0.064 0.702 0.991 N.A.
Non-White -0.128 -0.102 -0.360*** -0.133 -0.335** -0.156 0.047 -0.237** 0.009 0.051
other (0.149) (0.113) (0.139) (0.165) (0.202) (0.135) (0.124) (0.123) (0.113) (0.116)
P-value,
coefficient =
2016 value
0.322 0.330 0.006 0.341 0.050 0.218 0.983 0.059 0.802 N.A.
N 3,143 3,906 4,299 4,305 4,442 4,519 4,417 6,482 6,015 6,248
R-squared 0.548 0.509 0.490 0.499 0.555 0.528 0.523 0.454 0.501 0.522
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve (2017).
Coefficients have been multiplied by the scaling parameter for the inverse hyperbolic sine, 0.0001, and then transformed with eβ − 1. Statistical significance is calculated
from the untransformed coefficients and standard errors.
Control variables: Education level category (Less than high school diploma, high school diploma, some college, bachelor’s degree, graduate degree); Marital status; Sex
of single heads of household; Income category ($0-19,999, $20,000-49,999, $50,000-99,999, $100,000-199,999, $200,000+); Age category (0-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54,
65-74, 75+).
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Appendix Table 3. Pooled Net Worth Regressions (Least Squares, Inverse Hyperbolic Sine
Transformation)
(1) (2) (3)
1989-2016 1989-2007 2010-2016
Black -0.462*** -0.424*** -0.518***
(0.025) (0.032) (0.040)
P-value,
coefficient =
2016 value N.A. <0.001 N.A.
Hispanic -0.323*** -0.326*** -0.315***
(0.030) (0.039) (0.046)
P-value,
coefficient =
2016 value N.A. 0.855 N.A.
Non-White -0.124*** -0.160*** -0.064
other (0.042) (0.054) (0.068)
P-value,
coefficient =
2016 value N.A. 0.203 N.A.
N 47,776 29,031 18,745
R-squared 0.508 0.521 0.492
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve (2017).
Coefficients have been multiplied by the scaling parameter for the inverse hyperbolic sine, 0.0001, and then
transformed with eβ − 1. Statistical significance is calculated from the untransformed coefficients and standard
errors.
Control variables: Same as in Appendix Tables 2 and 4, plus year effects.
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Appendix Table 4. Net Worth Regressions (Least Absolute Deviations, Inverse Hyperbolic Sine Transformation)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 2016
Black -0.418*** -0.393*** -0.461*** -0.376*** -0.486*** -0.409*** -0.462*** -0.483*** -0.558*** -0.559***
(0.122) (0.082) (0.068) (0.084) (0.094) (0.096) (0.146) (0.082) (0.082) (0.077)
P-value,
coefficient =
2016 value 0.068 0.002 0.025 0.003 0.204 0.018 0.231 0.129 0.984 N.A.
Hispanic -0.529*** -0.365*** -0.385*** -0.286** -0.395*** -0.330*** -0.065 -0.286*** -0.394*** -0.398***
(0.155) (0.128) (0.132) (0.151) (0.088) (0.103) (0.091) (0.073) (0.091) (0.093)
P-value,
coefficient =
2016 value 0.142 0.761 0.877 0.292 0.960 0.408 0.001 0.136 0.961 N.A.
Non-White -0.122 -0.167 -0.329*** -0.252 -0.318* -0.071 0.045 -0.279** -0.108 0.066
other (0.164) (0.157) (0.152) (0.185) (0.228) (0.128) (0.152) (0.132) (0.105) (0.134)
P-value,
coefficient =
2016 value 0.256 0.216 0.049 0.133 0.056 0.459 0.912 0.027 0.249 N.A.
N 3,143 3,906 4,299 4,305 4,442 4,519 4,417 6,482 6,015 6,248
Pseudo .377 .353 .320 .341 .381 .362 .360 .336 .365 .368
R-squared
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve (2017).
Coefficients have been multiplied by the scaling parameter for the inverse hyperbolic sine, 0.0001, and then transformed with eβ − 1. Statistical significance is calculated
from the untransformed coefficients and standard errors.
Control variables: Education level category (Less than high school diploma, high school diploma, some college, bachelor’s degree, graduate degree); Marital status; Sex
of single heads of household; Income category ($0-19,999, $20,000-49,999, $50,000-99,999, $100,000-199,999, $200,000+); Age category (0-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54,
65-74, 75+).
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Appendix Table 5. Pooled Net Worth Regressions (Least Absolute Deviations, Inverse
Hyperbolic Sine Transformation)
(1) (2) (3)
1989-2016 1989-2007 2010-2016
Black -0.464*** -0.416*** -0.533***
(0.030) (0.038) (0.045)
P-value,
coefficient =
2016 value N.A. <0.001 N.A.
Hispanic -0.367*** -0.367*** -0.349***
(0.034) (0.047) (0.050)
P-value,
coefficient =
2016 value N.A. 0.928 N.A.
Non-White -0.138** -0.174*** -0.116**
Other (0.058) (0.069) (0.062)
P-value,
coefficient =
2016 value N.A. 0.491 N.A.
N 47,776 29,031 18,745
Pseudo
R-squared 0.355 0.356 0.356
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve (2017).
Coefficients have been multiplied by the scaling parameter for the inverse hyperbolic sine, 0.0001, and then
transformed with eβ − 1. Statistical significance is calculated from the untransformed coefficients and standard
errors.
Control variables: Same as in Appendix Tables 2 and 4, plus year effects.
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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